The purpose of this paper is to address the civil law aspects of parishes in the context of ongoing civil litigation affecting the lives of parishes and dioceses. This paper will address the question, what are the civil law attributes of the parish? To begin at the end, the answer is, whatever civil structure has been chosen for the parish will dictate its civil attributes. Although this sounds circular, it is accurate and precise. If the parish is a civil corporation, it has the attributes of such a corporation under the cor poration statutes of that particular jurisdiction, as amplified in the articles of incorporation and bylaws. If the parish is organized as a civil law trust, it has the attributes of a trust under the law of that state as well as any other attributes provided for it in the trust agreement. If the parish is con sidered an "unincorporated association," one follows the law of that state to determine who the members of the association are, and how power is allocated and governance is exercised. And if the parish is part of a statu tory or common law corporation sole diocese, well, that brings us a little further into the story and is a symptom of the instant difficulty.
In this paper, after laying some initial background, I will address the question of structure in more detail. Thereafter, I will evaluate the struc tural question in various factual situations that have occurred in cases af fecting dioceses. Then, I will look more closely at the questions created by the several bankruptcy cases involving Catholic dioceses in 2005. This will include a brief examination of the constitutional and corporate issues. Because the solution proposed for many of the difficulties facing dioceses is restructuring, I will take a more studied look at the legal and practical issues that could confound such deliberations. There is also an appendix listing some of the common legal issues confronting church administrators; and the list is a good starting point for practical discus sions about what the Church will look like in the years to come. I will end with some general observations about the nature of this undertaking.
I. Background1
Through the colonial period and thereafter, American Catholics la bored under many legal disabilities. A 1647 Massachusetts law banned members of the Society of Jesus from the Commonwealth. The first of fense was punishable by deportation; the second, by death.2 Similarly, an amendment proposed to 1777 New York state constitution permitted the holding of private property "[e]xcept the professors of the religion of the Church of Rome, who ought not to hold lands in, or be admitted to a par ticipation of the civil rights enjoyed by the members of this State until such time as [they] . . . solemnly swear" that they renounce the authority of the Pope and the doctrines of the Church including the absolution of sins. 3 Fortunately, that provision did not survive into the final version of the state constitution. However, in other colonies, later states, the Church went through various periods when its ability to hold property was under severe restrictions. Even in Maryland, founded by the Catholic Calverts, the Church was occasionally outlawed and therefore forbidden to own property, followed by years when it was "restored." 4 The solution adopted by the institutional Church was to place land in the hands of a reliable lay trustee who would hold the property in fee simple with the expectation that the property in fact belonged to the Church.5
It is not surprising, therefore, that the models through which churches held property in America were built around a Protestant polity.6 Those corporate forms that did exist provided for governance entirely by lay people. No clergy were permitted to serve on any church board.7 These entities were controlled like private non-religious agencies. They were subject not to church law, but only to the common law of the state. And there were no distinctions made among faith groups, as equality was nominally part of the American experience. Rather, one form of corpo rate ownership was expected to be applied by all faith groups, regardless of polity.
These disabilities did not affect the growth of the Church. Catholics continued to emigrate from the Old World to the New with the expecta tion that they would find freedom and opportunities denied to them in their countries of origin. They continued to move westward with other settlers. To provide for their own worship, the Catholic laity acquired land and, by their own hard labor, built the churches themselves in which they hoped they would be able to worship. Before dioceses were orga nized in the United States, lay Catholic settlers asked for the assignment of priests from bishops further East. If none were forthcoming, they bar gained with itinerant Catholic clergy.8 These bands of independent set tlers from time to time resisted the impositions of bishops, especially as dioceses were formed with the expectation that these independent settle ment churches would constitute the new parishes and be subject to the ecclesiastical authority of bishops.9 Catholic settlers, like other Ameri (1908) . Dignan discusses this series of Pennsylvania cases in which the bishop attempted to control property in conformity with Church law as against lay trustees. The Pennsylva nia Supreme Court rejected the bishop's attempt to assert canon law over the "controlling" requirements of the civil law on property (227-232). cans, were influenced by European rationalist thought which held that the conventions of society around matters of political and even ecclesi astical power were restraints on the minds of man. Part of the American experience, it was said, was to resist such restrictions.10
It would come as no surprise, then, to understand that this whole grow ing American experience with ecclesiastical government and the admin istration of temporal goods was contrary to the views espoused by the Catholic Church. In the Catholic tradition, rights of governance de scend.11 The parish has rights, not as a collective of its individual mem bers,12 but because the community is part of the universal Church. In our tradition, parishioners do not govern. Parishioners render assistance to the ecclesiastical agents who exercise governance of the parish and the larger Church.13 The members of the congregation, therefore, could not be members of the ecclesiastical corporation where they would be in po sition to govern. They could not be the trustees to the exclusion of the pastor. Rather the pastor, not lay trustees, must be in the position of gov ernance. The parish, not the congregation, is the body corporate.14 Hence, the contrast between the dominant American culture and the Church's ecclesiastical culture could not be more stark. This was re flected throughout the history of the Church in the United States in the administration of temporal goods and in controversies on other ques tions. A review of those controversies is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that lay Catholics have long had an independent streak. At the turn of the twentieth century, a fictional Irish-American bartender and political commentator, Mr. Dooley, was asked whether he was a 10 Dignan, 72. " Ibid., 51. 12 Michael McConnell, et al, Religion and the Constitution, 360 (Aspen 2002). In deed, discussions I have had with Protestant constitutional law colleagues have revealed deep divisions over whether ecclesiastical institutions themselves have rights that are separate and apart from those of the members. My Protestant colleagues often take the view that institutional rights are simply the aggregation of individual rights. I, on the other hand, have taken the view that the institution has rights separate and apart from those of individual members. This difference in theology is played out in the way that U.S. constitutional law has dealt with institutional free exercise questions over the last century.
13 One might compare canon 532 of the 1983 code (the pastor represents the parish in all its juridic business and administers its temporal goods) with canon 228, §2 (laity assist the pastors of the Church as experts and advisors).
14 Dignan, 51. See Mark Sargent, "The Diocese After Chapter 11," 29 Seton Hall J. Legis. 427, 428-29 (2005 
II. Structure
To recap my initial observation, the parish has a civil status-and therefore, rights, duties, and liabilities-fixed by its civil corporate char ter or other civil form, or the lack thereof. To look a little bit ahead, that means that a parish's canonical structures and rights must be expressed in civil documents themselves to be better assured, in this legal culture, that they will be adequately protected. From a short survey of colleagues, the dioceses and their parishes tend to have five or six structures. These structures often have as much to do with history and expectations dating to the time when the diocese was organized in that region and whether the state law reflected a tolerant attitude towards religious (especially Catholic) structures as with current needs.16 Professor William Bassett's treatise on religious organizations lists the following as example struc tures: religious corporation (special purpose corporation), nonprofit cor poration, religious trust, unincorporated association, and corporation sole.17 Catholic parishes and dioceses exhibit those structures.
In some states, for example, New York, parishes are civil religious corporations pursuant to the operation of state law. Under New York law, the bishop, pastor, chancellor, and two lay members are the corporate trustees of a Catholic parish corporation.18 In many instances the corpo rations operate collegially in the administration of church property. The rights and responsibilities of the parish corporation are found in the state statutes which provide for different denominations, section by section, There, the parish itself is held to be a trust, under the administra tion of a trustee (pastor or bishop depending on the nature of the entity) who exercises a fiduciary responsibility for the temporal goods. Under Texas law, dioceses are found to be common-law trusts, and in some places, parishes are administered on that basis.20 In New Hampshire, a recent ruling by a state chancery court confirms that some parishes are statutory trusts under operation of state trust law.21 In some places, parishes themselves are considered to be unincorporated associations within the overall structure of the diocese. At times, these associations are said to exist as a way of describing the parish as a canonical entity that has separate autonomy under the Church's canon law within the diocesan corporation sole.22 In other places, where the common-law cor poration sole form has been recognized for dioceses, some take the posi tion that parishes themselves are common-law corporations sole.23 More will be said about this form below. In the last five years, some dioceses have begun to organize parishes under the statutory corporation sole pro visions of the state. for it could create certain difficulties in the administration of temporal goods. For example, at common law, unincorporated associations lack the capacity to hold title to real property and the capacity to be sued.31 At common law, they are considered the aggregate of their individual mem bers, which means that title to real property must be held in the name of a member or small group of members (often trustees) on behalf of the as sociation, and that liabilities could be passed through to the individual members who risked the execution of judgments against their own prop erty to satisfy claims against the association.32 Modern state statutes have reformed these practices and provide that associations formed pur suant to these statutes have both the capacity to be sued and hold prop erty. In other words they have an existence apart from their members. There is often a requirement that the associations acquire liability insur ance against certain risks.33
At the same time, absent a constitutional requirement or a state statute that provides an exception for associations formed by religious organi zations to conform to the practices of the religion,34 an association will be expected to conform to the state law in all respects. Thus, in Catholic polity, one must determine how an unincorporated association could be formed. Associations are formed by "two or more members." Members, the parishes had no cognizable legal form, the District Court on appeal reversed finding the parishes stated a case that they were unincorporated associations under Washington law. There, the Texas Court recognized that modern associations have acquired the attributes of civil structures including property, bank accounts, and insurance and thus the law of Texas should recognize these developments. The result in that case was that a church member who was barred from suing the Association (her local unincorporated church) under the doctrine of imputed negligence was enabled to do so. In the process o f the liti gation, however, the Church, which had resisted incorporation along with other interac tions with the state on account of its religious doctrine, incorporated to spare itself future potential liabilities to the members. Chopko, "Derivative Liability," 620 (supra note 32).
34 For example, Minnesota law accommodates religious entities. E.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. Section 315.37 (West 1992).
in turn, are defined as those individuals with the power to make policy.35 Thus for Catholic entities, the question about who forms, controls, merges, or ends an association has special significance. The other for malities are simple compared to these initial questions.
Regardless of the particular structure chosen, the dilemma has always been how to administer parish property, without risking the diversion of assets, which is a consequence of too much or too little control. In choos ing civil forms, and providing for the civil legal operation of the parish, those civil legal choices must also conform to the canon law. It is to the evaluation of those structures in the face of certain facts and circum stances that the paper turns next.
III. Structure in Context Bankruptcy
The bankruptcies of three dioceses in the United States, Tucson, Port land in Oregon, and Spokane, in 2004 put into sharp relief the question of the civil structure of the parish. Each diocese showed far fewer assets than claimed demands in the abuse litigation that triggered the filing. The bulk of the property in the region of each diocese is held and adminis tered by the parishes. In the three dioceses in question, however, parishes were part of the diocesan corporation sole as they had been (with a few limited exceptions) since the time of the formation of the diocesan cor porations.36 Because the dioceses had sought protection through the pro vision of the federal bankruptcy code dealing with voluntary corporate reorganizations,37 and because as charities they could not be involuntar ily liquidated at the behest of creditors by operation of law,38 each dio cese claimed that its purpose in seeking the protection of the bankruptcy laws was to provide for relief from and orderly resolution of the extraor dinary demands made by litigants. Through the bankruptcy process, a diocese could find a safe way in which to reorganize its civil structure in a way that would be better suited to the stark realities of twenty first cen tury liability but still consonant with the Church's canon law.39 Indeed, in the plan of reorganization filed with the petition for bankruptcy by the Diocese of Tucson, the reorganization of the parishes as separate corpo rations was expressly described.40
In the situations of Portland and Spokane, because of the fact that the parishes hold and administer most of the assets in the region of the dioce ses, the dioceses have been litigating over the status of the parishes since the beginning of the process. Rather quickly in these bankruptcies, the claimants filed adversary actions seeking to declare that all parish prop erty in effect "belonged" to the diocesan debtor and thus was subject to ex ecution to satisfy the dioceses' debts.41 In separate rulings in August42 and The concept accepted by the District Judge was that the parishes were funded and devel oped by the work of individual Catholic communities, under a regime in which the local bishop always understood that even though he held title in his name it was actually a trust December, 2005,* 43 the bankruptcy courts rejected the arguments of both dioceses and held that the parishes belonged to the diocesan corporation sole. The courts in both instances rejected arguments that the statute pro viding for the creation of the corporation sole expressly incorporated con sideration of the Church's canon law.44 The courts also found that there was no "objective" evidence of the separate civil nature of parishes. Fi nally, the bankruptcy courts rejected arguments that the state law imposed various trust obligations on the bishops to hold the real property of the parishes as property of separate entities. Because the courts ruled that parishes lacked civil structure, any trust obligations, the courts decided, were to hold property not for the benefit of the parishes, but for the bene fit of the dioceses.45 It should also be noted that at least in Spokane the claimants targeted the property of all separate corporations, including schools and cemeteries, which they claimed legally belonged to the dio ceses.46 Thus, the Spokane claimants also asserted that even separately in corporated property was not beyond their reach as creditors of the diocese.
The long term administration of the parishes and their legitimate au tonomy under church law was irrelevant to the bankruptcy judges. And the context of bankruptcy made the claimants' arguments more appeal ing. As will be discussed later, the bankruptcy courts are considered courts of equity with broad powers to acquire assets to satisfy debts.
Liability
At the same time, there are persistent questions whether parishes, even parishes that are part of the corporation sole, can be liable in tort. 45 E.g., Spokane Decision, 328. In a separate ruling, the bankruptcy court excluded all contrary evidence to its conclusions as irrelevant. By contrast, the District Court on appeal considered the record as a whole, finding the treatment of the evidence by the bankruptcy court to be erroneous. Reviewing all the proffered evidence, he found that the parishes could be unincorporated associations under Washington state law, capable of being the beneficiaries of a constructive or "resulting trust." See discussion infra at note 84 ff.
46 For example, Catholic Charities and Cemeteries were implicated in the cases. The case law has been clear that parish liability (where the parishes are separately organized) is not identical to diocesan liability. See, e.g., Plate v. St M 
ary' s Help o f Christians
Whether parishes have the capacity to be sued is answered only in part by their corporate structure. In my view, even for parishes that are sepa rately incorporated, what matters more is the nature of the dispute and the substance of the claim. As I have described more fully elsewhere,47 different religious polities assign different responsibilities to different places in a church's ecclesiastical organization. The administration of real property might be vested in parish churches, while the supervision of clergy could be assigned to regional judicatories. Thus, a slip and fall claim might clearly be within the purview of the parish which has direct oversight of that property. On the other hand, a negligent supervision claim about the misconduct of the parish priest could not be stated against the parish as the parish is not the priest's supervisor.48 Where the structure does not adequately provide for separation between activities that legally belong to the parish and those that legally belong to the dio cese, claimants will continue to sue both and hope that the defendants sort out their responsibilities. Liability, after all, follows responsibility.49 The issue gets tricky, however, in instances involving the alleged negli gence of parish employees or volunteers of which the diocese is com pletely unaware.
On the other hand, the case law in the United States has shown that the absence of structure for parishes within a corporation sole provides some measure of insulation for those parishes against any claims. In a case in volving an anti-discrimination charge arising at a parish school, for ex ample, it was held that the parish, as a department or activity of the corporation sole, lacked the capacity to be sued on account of the antidiscrimination claim.50 Rather, the claim properly would lie against the diocese. Similarly, in a case involving a workers compensation issue, a state supreme court has held that the responsibility for a worker, injured on parish property that was part of the diocesan corporation sole, rested with the diocese even though the diocese did not even know the worker had been hired.51 The corporation sole was formed to hold, administer, and maintain property. The court reasoned that, having chosen this form of corporate ownership to achieve certain benefits through the uniform administration of property, it could not disclaim the burdens including the responsibility for those injured on the real property.52
Still, there has been a tendency in some liability complaints to sweep together ecclesiastical entities that are related to each other only on ac count of their common fealty to a religion or a movement. Plaintiffs occasionally sue everyone and everything that could conceivably, "on information and belief," have something to do with the claimed wrongfrom the pope to the parochial vicar to lay volunteers, from the Vatican to the parish school hall, and everyone and anything in between. One or more of these individuals or entities might be responsible. Others might be willing to contribute insurance funds to extricate themselves from po tentially years of litigation, making the payoff larger. Elsewhere I refer to this as the "nameplate" problem.53 The essence of the claim is that all of these agencies have the same name in their title, for example, Catholic or Lutheran or Boy Scouts, and therefore they all must have colluded to cre ate the problem which has been experienced by the plaintiff. One Cali fornia court, a generation ago, found that the United Methodist Church was an unincorporated association, "United" on account of its ecclesias tical documents.54 Thus, the entire denomination was potentially at risk because of the bankruptcy of certain retirement homes that were owned by regional church agencies. Although the case eventually was settled, it stands as a warning beacon to pay attention to questions of structure and relationship. In every case following, no court has adopted this breath taking rationale but rather has respected the polity of the churches in volved, and not imposed a structure on a church that is contrary to the one that it has chosen. 
Bequests
Whether parishes have the capacity to receive gifts was a question asked in the context of the bankruptcies.57 That same question occurs every day in dioceses across the United States. There is a tendencycorrect I think-sometimes to think of our Church as a diocesan church. Surely the Catholic Church, regardless of the civil structures of dioceses and parishes, is not a collection of independent parish churches. Yet parishioners leave gifts to parishes every day and, again regardless of the civil structures, those restricted gifts must be respected by church administrators.
At the same time, among those administrators, there is a tendency to think of the Church in egalitarian terms. In one instance, a bequest to a single parish in a poor region of a diocese created the effect that this one parish had great wealth at the expense of its neighbors. That one parish should be so wealthy in its temporal goods in the midst of its poor neigh bors is sometimes too much to bear. In the particular case, the adminis tration of the bequest was not even in the hands of ecclesiastical admin istrators such as the pastor, but in the hands of a parish society of uncertain civil status. Eventually, the courts were called on to determine to what extent the donation to the parish should take precedence over ap plying the bequest to a broader range of potential beneficiaries.58 The matter was happily settled but not before raising some of the practical difficulties that one must confront in examining questions of structure and organization. In a diocese organized as a corporation sole, the temp 57 That parishes may receive gifts and have these gifts be respected as "belonging" to the parishes and accounted for accordingly does not by itself create a structure not other wise provided for by a diocese or by operation of the civil law. The Bankruptcy Court noted in the Spokane decision that a gift to a scout camp on federal land does not change the landowner from the federal government to the Scouts. Spokane decision, 331. But even in the absence of an express separate structure, such restrictions should be strong enough in practice to protect the gift against being treated as an unrestricted asset of a cor poration sole diocese. tation would be strong to step in and provide a benefit for more par ishes.59 On the other hand, where the parish is organized as a separate corporation, what would prevent the parish from ignoring the views of the diocese?
Landmarking
In the same way, dioceses and parishes confront local land use author ities and state and federal historic preservation offices often as allies but sometimes not. This is another area where the civil structure of the parish may or may not help to resolve questions of land-use controls and his toric preservation. In a structure where parishes are separate civil enti ties, who could decide whether particular property in a parish should be landmarked as historically significant? The pastor or the bishop? The parish or the diocese? The civil law usually only provides that the "landowner" can register or, conversely, can object to involuntary registration. In some places, the device of historic preservation has been attempted as a way to block the sale of church properties in parishes that have been slated for closure. Again, where dioceses are organized as corporations sole, there would be a temptation to preclude any (legal) voice for the parish. However, even in that situation, the parish has to have a role and that role would have to be considered in diocesan policy. And if the parishes are separate civil entities, would the diocese have a (legal) voice? This species of land use question also involves consideration of certain beneficial interests in broadly defined "enjoyment" and the pub lic interest in the administration of certain parish properties.
Parish Consolidation and Liquidation
The case law in the United States is generally deferential to the rights of bishops in parish consolidation and liquidation cases.60 Recent events have confirmed the importance of the primacy of the canon law as part of 59 This temptation should always be resisted in matters of the administration of tem poral goods. Clearly the beneficiary is obliged to use the bequest according to its terms, or was obliged under the canon law to refuse it. As I understand the hypothetical, the benefitted parish already had exhausted the possible objects of the benefice; and others started to look for ways to extend the gift without violating the terms of the gift. A cy pres pro ceeding would be one way to examine those questions but should be done in a such a way as to respect the autonomy of both the diocese and the parish. the decision-making process. Most of the legal treatment of these ques tions has found that there are constitutional barriers which bar the litiga tion of these kinds of cases at the behest of the former parishioners.61 Such questions, the courts have held, implicate ecclesiastical decision making about the needs of the faith community.62 To allow such ques tions to be adjudicated in the civil courts is to give the civil courts the possible power to dictate ecclesiastical choices. It has long been the rule in the United States that those questions are beyond the jurisdiction of the civil courts.63
The Church's decision-making process must be rooted in the canon law and reflect the real needs of the parish in the diocese. In instances where further scrutiny can be contemplated, whether in the press, or through an attempt to assert jurisdiction in a civil court, or in the proper congregation of the Church in Rome, the decision-making process em ployed by the diocese should reflect a consideration of the factors in volved whether it is demographics or finances or more, real consultation, and an overall master plan about where the diocesan and parish churches should go in the coming years to serve best the religious needs of the peo ple and provide for their spiritual welfare. That process will create a bar rier to the re-examination of religious decision-making in the civil courts. A question which could deserve further attention in the future is the consequence of the apparent decisions of the Holy See that the phys ical assets of the parish should follow the people to their new parishes. 64 As noted above, the courts unanimously hold that former parishioners do not have beneficial (that is to say, enforceable legal) interests. Thus, o avoid a misunderstanding about the nature of the church's actions, a decision that assets follow the people must be clearly explained in struc tural, rather than congregational, terms.65
IV. A Closer Look at Bankruptcy
Parishes are separate juridic persons from dioceses under the canon law.66 In the territory of the dioceses, most of the pastoral activity occurs in parishes. And-not surprisingly-the bulk of the assets is held and ad ministered by parishes, separate from the assets of the diocese, regard less of how the diocese is civilly organized. At the same time, parishes and dioceses are illiquid, in that most of their "net worth" is normally in the physical property and not in cash accounts. The bankruptcy cases brought scrutiny to certain of the operating assumptions used by dioce ses and parishes over the years: Most dioceses are organized as corpora tions sole; parishes often (but not always) lack their own express civil identity within the structure which in turn relies on administration and decision-making according to the principles of the Code of Canon Law. In other words, parishes have their own legitimate autonomy that is re spected by the bishop, and administer their own temporal goods on a daily basis apart from those of other parishes and of the diocese. That is a maxim that has been repeated many times in the last several years.
However, when the tort claimants understood that most of the illiquid (and liquid) property is not in the hands of the diocese, but rather in the hands of the parishes, the parish property quickly became the battle ground in the bankruptcy cases.67 The message in the media was that the diocesan bankruptcy reorganizations were nothing more than strategems 65 Some have speculated about the apparent lack of consistency between ecclesiasti cal decisions about parish property made in Boston on the one hand and Spokane on the other. In my view, they were different questions; and the answers were entirely consistent with each other because they were rooted in the canon law. For example, Boston sought reor-ganization under a broad plan and with broad consultation to provide for future parish needs by parish closings and consolidations. It was not saying the parishes had no rights under the law of the Church but rather that those rights had been respected in the process. Spokane's actions likewise respect the rights of the parishes, which participate as litigants in the bankruptcy proceeding. But because the nature of the undertakings is so different, the processes followed are different. Nonetheless, at the same time, I will come back to the express consideration of the common good of the Church in the United States as a key factor in consistent planning to deal with these questions.
66 Canon 515, §3. to cheat victims and other creditors out of their justified damages.68 The drama was played out, as noted above, in a court of equity that exists pri marily to match debts and assets and to pay creditors as fully as possible. That court has broad consolidation powers, and its decisions have placed, in the cases involving U.S. dioceses, a great deal of stress, to say the least, on structural questions.
The downside risks of filing for the protection of a bankruptcy court are clear. Dioceses may experience a loss of governance independence to outsiders. The courts themselves are ill-equipped to understand and deal with canonical argument, resulting in a disregard of the canonical pro tections that church administrators previously took for granted. The dec laration of the bankruptcy courts may also negatively impact what is happening in neighboring dioceses because of the legal questions that are resolved, the financial and other questions that are implicated, and the outpouring of claims and creditors that may also fall on neighboring dioceses. At the same time, however, dioceses are facing challenges that they have never historically faced; finances are dwindling in many places in the face of hundreds of claims; and insurers have abandoned their obligations of defense and compensation. Desperate times often call for desperate measures.69
The dioceses of Portland and Spokane have taken the position that the parishes have proper canonical autonomy that is in fact protected under the substantive laws of their respective states and by the Constitution. Even though they are part of the diocesan corporation sole, the parishes are subject always to the Church's canon law and the day-to-day admin istration of parishes is properly in the hands of pastors, not bishops. Fail ing that, the dioceses argued that the courts were constitutionally barred from effectively reorganizing the dioceses to please their creditors. Overruling a constitutionally protected choice as to organizational form, 69 Although there may be lessons to be learned in the successful resolution of the Tuc son bankruptcy, a particular critique of these various approaches is beyond the scope of this paper. See Arthur Rotstein, "Tucson Diocese Bankruptcy Effectively over a Year Later," http://www.bishop-accountability.org/news2005_07_12/2005_09_18_Rotstein_ TucsonDiocese.htm . In addition at this writing it is too early to tell whether the Daven port diocese, which is organized as a corporation and where each parish is also separately incorporated, will be subjected to the same kind of litigation over the parish properties as has occurred in Spokane and Portland. it was argued, would be tantamount to disregarding the Church's cen turies-old polity.70 The dioceses made rather sophisticated arguments under state corporation, trust, property, and constitutional law. At this writing, the only decisions of record are those by the two bankruptcy courts in Spokane and Portland which rejected these arguments com pletely and the decision of the district judge in Spokane who reversed, re lying on one aspect of Washington's trust law.
To illustrate how courts might react to some of the organizational and operational decisions made by dioceses a century ago, I look more closely at the rulings of the bankruptcy courts. Not surprisingly, given the similar approaches in both cases, the two bankruptcy courts decided them around similar themes. One theme in the courts' decisions is that the dioceses made choices which had consequences that the courts would honor, both as to the corporate form and as to the bankruptcy forum. Enforcing the consequences of those choices did not violate the First Amendment or in any way interfere with the Church's right to make those choices in the first place, the courts concluded. "[The Diocese] has choices about how to organize itself under civil law in a way that recog nizes and implements its internal organization with relation to the secu lar world."71 This rationale mirrored that adopted in earlier decisions in volving the corporation sole form.72 In the same way, by applying the general rules of bankruptcy law to these proceedings, the courts empha sized that implementing the consequences of these choices would bring consistency to the treatment of these debtors vis-a-vis other debtors with regard to their creditors.73 After all it was the dioceses that choose the bankruptcy forum: "It is not a burden on a religious organization that voluntarily seeks the protection of the bankruptcy laws to require it to treat its creditors in the same manner as any other debtor."74 Application of any other body of law would disregard those choices and would, in view of the bankruptcy courts, be unfair.75 74 Spokane Decision, 325. 75 "Fair and equitable treatment of all creditors requires application of civil law not only to determine their rights to recover from assets of the debtor, but to first define the in terest of the debtor in those assets." (Ibid.).
The dioceses made similar arguments that the state corporation laws, which allowed for the incorporation of the dioceses, in effect incorpo rated by reference and contemplated use of the Church's canon law. The corporation sole statutes in both states permit the incorporation of a church office by the person of the office holder if in accord with the rules of the religious denomination. Unlike the incorporation laws of other states which are sect specific, the corporation sole statutes in Washington and Oregon are more generic. In order to determine what ecclesiastical office is incorporated, including its powers and limitations, one must re sort to the internal law of the religious denomination. It was that argu ment which the courts rejected. To be sure, this was a novel argument as all would be in cases of first impression, but one built on a firm founda tion.76 It is, after all, not the person of the bishop but the office of the bishop which is incorporated. Without reference to the internal law of the Church, how could one test the validity of any corporate act? How could a bank, for example, know whether a bishop had the power to request a loan or sell property without being able to resort to church law? Nonethe less, the courts concluded that the fact "that an officer or director of a cor poration sole may rely on religious authorities or personnel in discharg ing his duties does not require application of canon law to all of the corporation's relationships or interaction with the secular world, includ ing its need to follow the formalities of state property or trust law with re gard to the property it holds."77 That there was no evidence of a separate corporate existence or trust status for the parishes in the deeds, title records, organizational documents, or other civil legal records bearing external evidence was fatal to the dioceses' arguments.78
Both courts were concerned about the apparent lack of accountability to the civil courts and to creditors. In oral argument in the Spokane case, for example, the bankruptcy judge asked diocesan counsel a 76 See DiPietro, "Relevance of Canon Law,"404-405 (note 44 supra). 77 Portland decision. 856. Likewise the courts excluded evidence about the contribu tion patterns that built the parishes and the autonomy under which the daily administration of the parishes occurred. The bishops had considered the parishes "trusts" pursuant to their canonical obligations of supervision.
78 Indeed, the Portland Court noted that several parishes in the Portland Archdiocese had been separately incorporated for a number of years and had been de-incorporated and folded into the corporation sole fairly recently. The court also noted that the canon law did not preclude some other arrangement, such as a separate corporation or express trust that could be documented in accord with the civil law. 335 BR at 861-2. The court cited the archdiocese's own canonical experts against it, noting that canon law experts have long stressed the importance of conforming the civil structures to the canon law. Ibid., 866; see also ibid., 857 & n. 15.
hypothetical-"what if a church had a canonical rule that it would not pay the debts of nonmembers?"79 In other words, if the argument is that the courts must defer to the application of the Church's canon law in the evaluation of title with consequences for the payment of creditors, how far does that argument go? As answered by one decision, corporation sole law allows corporations sole to operate in ac cordance with church law. Thus, it allows the corporation to structure its organization under the civil law in a way that recog nizes and effectuates canon law. It does not, however, require that civil courts rely on canon law to determine rights in property held by the corporation sole. In other words, although the corpo ration sole is authorized by state law to organize its affairs pursuant to canon law, it is the corporation's organization and structure as implemented under civil law that governs the corpo ration's relationship with the secular world.80
The arguments of the dioceses were designed to avoid a direct clash between the civil law and the canon law.81 Indeed, both argued that what they proposed was entirely compatible with the civil law. The laws of the various states contemplated reference to the internal law of the religious denomination to decide certain questions of power, authority, limita tions, and governance. While the civil law of the states did not preclude different choices by the dioceses with regard to the creation of civil struc tures, there was no perceived need in either diocese to have put in place a different civil structure, given their understanding that the operation of the state corporation code did not bar the trust obligations imposed on the diocesan bishops under the canon law. In effect, this was the flip side of the theme the courts adopted around "choice. mitted and religious law required.82 To make the point more clearly, if these opinions are an accurate recitation of the law of the land as it is and always has been, it seems to me that the "choice" of the corporation sole model, with the potentially destructive effect on parishes in disregard of the polity of the Church, is a choice the dioceses could not have made. To have done so would have been contrary to the canon law, something no administrator of the temporal goods of the Church can do without risking penalty under church law.83
In a June 30,2006 ruling, a federal District Court reversed the Spokane bankruptcy decision and expounded the undisputed evidence about the consistent manner in which the parish property has been treated by the diocese and the parishes themselves. To buttress the conclusion that the parish real properties were part of the corporation sole, the Spokane bankruptcy judge had excluded virtually all the evidence proffered by the diocese and the parishes on the consistent canonical administration of the parish properties. On appeal, the district judge considered the record as a whole and construed the inferences in the evidence in favor of the "non moving parties," the diocese and the parishes.84 That evidence as noted above showed that the Bishops of Spokane had treated the parishes as "trusts" pursuant to their canonical obligations of supervision (not control or administration).85 He recognized the parishes' evidence as establishing 82 . The decisions of both bankruptcy courts were rendered as "summary judgment" for the tort litigants. Such a decision means that the court finds there are no disputes about the material facts and the court is essentially applying the law to a set of facts that are not contested. Under the rules o f procedure an appeal of such a deci sion is tested by the reviewing court de novo in which the court gives the non-moving party (that is, the party opposing summary judgment) the benefit of the doubt and con strues the evidence in its favor. The reversal therefore is not a view of the merits in fact, but only what the result could be if the assumptions about what the evidence would show at trial were shown to be true.
85 Dist.Ct. at * 10. One news article noted that, in oral argument, the judge read a 1935 letter from the then Bishop of Spokane stating his obligations to hold a parish as a trust, regardless of the civil form. John Stucke, "Parish Assets Protected," Spokesman-Review that they had sufficient legal capacity as "unincorporated associations" to be the beneficiaries of "resulting trusts."86 Whether that conclusion was warranted would require proof in each individual case involving the cir cumstances of the acquisition and improvement of each parish property.87 He further noted that, although the diocese held legal title, it always held title (not in a canonical but a civil sense)88 "for the benefit of the individ ual parish."89 Perhaps this portends well for the future.
Although the dioceses argued their cases in ways to avoid a direct con stitutional clash, as noted immediately above, there certainly are consti tutional issues in these cases. The Constitution provides broad protections for a religious organization to describe and organize itself according to re ligious principles.90 The Supreme Court's rule requires that a civil court defer to the decision of the Church on questions of governance and not entertain jurisdiction to resolve the case itself.91 Notwithstanding that (June 16, 2006) found at http://www.spokesmanreview.com/sections/diocese/?ID= 135890. It is quoted at length in the opinion. Dist.Ct. at *6.
86 Dist.Ct. at * 10. A "resulting trust" is a form of constructive trust imposed on a prop erty to avoid manifest injustice if it were not imposed. http://www.thelawencyclopedia .com/term/resulting_trust?gclid=CPTuhLC-2oUCFRFuFQodGE3-kw. In a situation where one party by agreement holds title to property for another's benefit, applying the formal civil title to resolve the question creates an injustice for the intended beneficiary. The court noted that this was the secondary argument of the parishes, the primary being that they owned the property. Dist.Ct. at * 11.
87 Nonetheless the judge found the evidence so far adduced was "clear and convinc ing" that a resulting trust could be inferred. Dist.Ct. at * 12.
88 The court "[found] it may consider Canon Law in making a determination of the parties' intent when purchasing real property, constructing churches and making im provements___" Dist.Ct. at * 13. But the court disclaimed reliance on the canon law, find ing that the pattern of actual behavior in financing and donations provided better evidence of the parties' true intentions. Ibid.
He did not rule the diocese or the parishes were entitled to summary judgment, but that the bankruptcy judge erred in reaching a conclusion of law when it ruled that parishes lack a legal interest in their property. He thus remanded the case for further proceedings in the bankruptcy court with a long discourse in oral argument (transcript referenced supra note 22) about the real benefits to all the parties settling the bankruptcy case, sooner rather than later. 1976) . In particu lar, the court noted as an error that the lower courts had taken expert testimony about the meaning and application of the church's internal laws to the dispute. That inquiry, the seven justice majority said, violated the Constitution. Ibid., 718-720. That same form of action could likely preclude the disputes over a bishop's canonical responsibilities that plague US misconduct cases. rule, the Supreme Court and other courts have also attempted to resolve property disputes by means of "neutral principles."92 Under relevant Supreme Court doctrine, when courts apply "neutral principles" review, they should look at more than the title and other civil documents. Those courts should also study the relevant church docu ments and organizational materials that would govern the actual daily administration and operation of the properties.93 The Supreme Court in that case encouraged religious organizations to resolve ambiguities in their title records to be certain that, if a dispute arose in the future, that dispute would be resolved consistent with the expectations of the reli gious body.94 At the same time, commentators note that "neutral princi ples" review does not allow for a court to resolve a religious property question in any way that is inconsistent with the polity of that church.95
Even examining the situation neutrally, the dioceses had argued, all of the evidence pointed to the existence of a trust relationship between the diocese and the parishes. The District Court in Spokane recognized that the evidence presented in the case so far tends to show the parishes have the capacity to be the beneficiaries of a trust. As noted above, however, the bankruptcy courts rejected those arguments, concluding that the parishes were legally a part of the diocesan corporations sole.
Both courts showed their over sensitivity to the possibility of utilizing canon law, perhaps because of the fairness issue discussed above, but also perhaps out of concern that to apply that body of law could actually cre ate the constitutional issue the courts zealously tried to avoid.96 In my 92 ) . In point of fact, the Bishops' Conference had filed an amicus curiae brief in Jones v. Wolf protesting the possibility of "neutral princi ples" review, saying that it ran the risk of artificially divorcing property questions from governance. In this way it risked decisions that were contrary to the ecclesiology o f the re ligious body. See H. Reese Hansen, "Religious Organizations and the Law of Trusts," in Serritella, Religious Organizations, 301-303 (note 17 supra) (criticizing wooden applica tion of "neutral principles").
96 Of course, an answer to this concern is illustrated by the US Supreme Court's deci sion in Gonzales v. Roman Catholic Archbishop o f Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929) . There the court reviewed a case challenging a testamentary trust that ultimately relied on the canon law to determine whether a potential beneficiary was eligible for a chaplaincy that in turn would provide him with income from the trust. The qualifications for a chaplain were mat ters of religious law beyond the ken of the secular courts. But the relevance is that the court view, there is a big "distinction between establishing a religion and taking cognizance of the fundamental discipline of the church as established by its founders. To fail to respect that discipline could lead to the diversion of assets dedicated over the centuries to cherished beliefs.''97 As noted else where, "[t]o force upon [the Church] an unaccustomed economy would introduce confusion and embarrassment; whereas to refuse them corpo rate capacity, except on the condition of renouncing their customs, would be an illiberal treatment by the state."98 The alteration of the polity of a church through the operation of these bankruptcy decisions does indeed infringe the religious freedom of the institution, to say nothing of the po tential burden on the faith community should every stick of property now be subject to execution at the behest of the dioceses' creditors.99
In light of these developments, in every comer of the United States, experts study the question of reorganizing and restructuring the dioceses and parishes of the Church. Such study was long overdue in my view. 100 The stmctures that were put in place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have shown that they are not entirely adaptable to the realities and stresses we experience in the twenty first. In saying this, however, there is not a straightforward or easy answer. Each diocese will have to evaluate the risk versus the possible benefits that would accompany any particular reorganization. Among other things, dioceses should be decid ing whether an adequate civil format is available and achievable. Will the diocese be able to capitalize the various entities that it creates? How was construing a civil trust involving a potential beneficiary and ultimately upholding the person's disqualification because of church law. Compare Spokane decision, 325 ("This argum ent. . . is in essence a request to impose internal ecclesiastical rules upon third par ties who deal with the debtor in secular transactions.") Interpretation o f church law would create the constitutional problem; application of that law when contemplated in the civil documents would not. much self-sufficiency will be allowed the new structures? Can the new constellation of structures be properly administered by the personnel in place and who will be providing for their training and seeing to it that they act in accord with laws of the Church? To return to the administra tive question posed earlier, how much control will prove to be too much, in effect defeating the purpose of setting up new structures,101 and how much will be too little, opening the door to the possibility that some of our institutions may seek to separate themselves from the denomination?
There are certain issues that must be evaluated to address the legal for malities needed for this kind of wholesale change. For example, dioceses and parishes may create both civil articles of incorporation or association or a trust agreement and canonical statutes. Bylaws and other operational directives will also guide church administrators after this process. Given the rulings of the bankruptcy courts, essential pieces of this exercise will be to examine whether the title records for the real properties clearly in dicate which entity exercises the indicia of ownership. If there is ambi guity, this evaluation should identify the sources of the ambiguity and ways in which it can be addressed and rectified. Other denominations have inserted "trust clauses" into the governing and title documents of related church agencies to provide that if there is a situation in which the property might be taken by another, the property reverts to the denomi nation or some other church agency. Because these devices are under legal attack in various denominations,102 the existence of the connection to the communion that is the Church must be clear and unambiguous. Pius X, a priest sought possession of a corporation sole parish against the larger religious body. His predecessor had pur ported to amend the articles of incorporation to allow him to designate Father Berry as his successor. The California courts did not permit him to succeed to the corporation sole, be cause the purported amendment on succession in office lacked the requisite prior approval by the religious body (as required in the California corporation sole statute). 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 574, 577, 583-86 (Cal. App.1999). These cases counsel that care should be taken in drafting articles and bylaws especially when there is no statutory saving provision as in this case.
Failing to address these issues adequately could lead to a court disre garding the structure. In a liability situation, multiple church agencies will be sued and there will be some effort to reach the assets of related church entities to pay the debts created by another. The common law pro vides that corporations are entitled to a presumption that they are sepa rate and legitimate except when it can be proved that they are operated as the alter ego of some other.104 The court will look, among several factors, at the degree of capitalization to determine whether the funding levels are proper. The court will examine whether it is micro managed by the parent or some other related corporation such that one is a mere pawn of the other. A major factor in evaluating the independence of corporations is whether the corporations observe the legal formalities required by the civil law. If dioceses do not follow the requirements of the civil law in the organization and operation of newly separate agencies, they might be imploded in a liability crisis.105
These formalities cannot be ignored simply because they are inconve nient or expensive. If there are co-mingled assets, liabilities, and gover nance in newly separated entities, continuing to treat them all as other ex pressions of the diocese, the civil courts will treat them in precisely the same way.106 Most importantly, if dioceses and parishes depend on the 105 Bainbridge & Cole (note 56 supra) conclude, after reviewing the various factors that courts use to look beyond corporate structure, that the likelihood of a court disregard ing the separate structures of Catholic entities in a diocese is remote if the canon law is properly followed. Ibid., 13,23, and 27. A recent case in which the court held it would not disregard the separate structures is Taeger v. Catholic Family and Community Services, 955 P.2d 721 (Ariz. App. 1999), where the bishop was on the board, real estate was in the name of the diocesan corporation, and financial statements listed the assets as assets of the diocese. The court held the plaintiffs could not prove the charitable corporation was a "mere instrumentality" of the diocese or bishop. Ibid., 734. Bainbridge & Cole conclude the control was consistent with canon law and respected the autonomy of the charitable agency. (27, note 56 supra). Likewise the court distinguished between ecclesiastical con trol and civil control, finding the former insufficient to cause the agency to be the alter ego of the diocese. 955 P.2d at 735. This conclusion is consistent with the way other courts have approached such liability issues. Chopko, "Stating Claims," 1105 (note 47 supra). On the other hand as the discussion above also illustrates, the civil law in the end will be what the civil courts follow. Thus if church agencies intend the application of church law, the civil documents should so state. canon law as part of their defense in property and liability litigation, it must be followed rigorously.
In some measure this means that dioceses must work for consistent ap plication of the civil and canon law in their own territories. In the end, dioceses may decide that there is no uniform structure that can be achieved for all the parishes in the diocese, because of differences in size, geography, or hnances. But the diocese must be able to explain to the parishes and the people the choices that will be made, and be prepared to defend them in court where every little inconsistency will be attempted (in my view unfairly) to be exploited. But dioceses must also work to gether in provinces and states-in other words where the applicable civil laws are the same-not for identical structures but for not inconsistent structures and approaches to issues they will each confront in their civil affairs. Dioceses in the United States should also be using the framework of the episcopal conference as a vehicle in which some of the common civil, canonical, and constitutional issues can be explored collaboratively. If they cannot follow through on these commitments, they may be creating bigger issues for the next generation of church administrators in their own dioceses and beyond.
Attached to this paper is a list of what I call "principal legal issues" that should be evaluated as one is studying restructuring diocesan opera tions. This list is not intended to be exhaustive but rather illustrative of the kinds of problems that should be thought about in deciding how church entities should be structured. Some of these issues are set forth in the margin.107 Failing to undertake this kind of searching analysis could undo even the best efforts to preserve temporal goods in accord with the canon law.
Not to muddy the waters further, but, without careful planning, it is foreseeable that dioceses and parishes may have much about which to dispute. For example, if a school and a church are operated on the same property, the records should be clear as to which entity is the owner of what and, in the end, which entity is responsible for the operation and ad
The case involved the failed sale of a St Bernard dog from a Swiss monastery to a Cali fornia citizen who sued a variety of defendants on an alter ego theory. He won in the Su perior Court and reversal came in the above cited case on mandamus.
107 Some of these matters involve liability and insurance, the management of bank ac counts, the administration of contracts and leases, operation of real property, taxation and tax exemption matters, labor and employment issues, child protection issues, record keeping, and relations with the municipal government. See Appendix to this paper. ministration of the school. Some dioceses, notwithstanding the separate canonical existence of the parishes, operate the schools as a form of school system by way of centralized operations and hiring.
In some ways, that kind of dispute is easy compared to the kind of dis pute that could occur over operational matters. For example, suppose a parish wants to modify a standard contract or diocesan policy. Suppose a diocese is concerned about the possibility of financial self-dealing on a parish council. Suppose pastors dispute with diocesan officials over the extent and administration of benefits or employment issues. The issue of who is responsible for what is only part of the equation. The other part is building in a dispute resolution mechanism consistent with the expecta tion of the parties that together they are all responsible for the common good of the Church in that place.
VI. Final Observations
It should be obvious by now there is no single answer to the structural questions facing the Church in the United States at this point in its his tory. Nor is there an easy answer to some of the practical questions that must be unraveled. In making decisions, we must be clear, faithful to the civil and the canon law, and in communion with each other. Unfortu nately, given the times, we must also be precise about what we are un dertaking and why. As one English jurist said:
It is not enough to attain a degree of precision which a person reading in good faith can understand, but it is necessary to attain if possible to a degree of precision which a person reading in bad faith cannot misunderstand.108
In observations he made in 1829 and published ten years later, Bishop John England of Charleston criticized some of the administrative choices being made in the United States for the operation of Catholic entities. In his view, Catholic entities were among those institutions most negli gently managed.109 Church administrators were guilty of not taking ad vantage of the various bylaws and legal elements to provide discipline for corporate activities and confine the work of trustees to their proper spheres. Bishop England said that we are "better protected by law than by expedients. self governance just like any other organization in the society. Those choices about self governance, he said, would be entitled to respect by the civil courts:
I do not know any system more favorable to the security of reli gious rights and of Church property than that of American law. I have consulted eminent jurists on the subject, I have closely studied it, and have acted according to its provisions in various circumstances, favorable and unfavorable, during several years, and in many of the details and as a whole, I prefer it to the law of almost every Catholic country with which I am acquainted......... The state recognizes in each [voluntary] society . . . the right to make for itself a constitution or form of government, and by laws for the management of its own concerns; and when they are regularly made, it recognizes their force within that body----Upon these principles there is no difficulty for a body of Cath olics to assemble, to form themselves into an association, to rec ognize the power of their Pope, of their bishop, of their priests, and the several rights of each individual or body according to the doctrine and discipline of their church; they can, without depart ing from that doctrine or discipline, regulate the manner in which the property is to be held, and how it is to be managed, and can establish rules to restrict and to direct its managers.. . .
By this process of American law, no person is obliged to belong to any religious society except he shall desire it himself, and he cannot obtrude himself upon any religious society which is not willing to receive him, or whose constitution he violates; and the legal tribunals of the states must, should questions of litigation arise, govern their decisions by the constitution and bylaws of the Society itself, provided these laws are not incompatible with the laws of the particular state or of the United States.111
According to Bishop England, if the Church failed to make adequate rules to direct internal governance, the fault was not the civil law but the Church's administrators.112 With the proper tools, the administration of the Church would be more consistent with the canon law and adequately protected by the civil law. How prescient he was for this discussion. More over, he accurately predicted the principle announced 40 years later, when the Supreme Court declared in 1872, that those who unite themselves to gether in a faith community consent to the rules and protocols of that faith community. Having so consented to the doctrine and discipline of the re ligious community, "it would be a vain consent, and lead to the total sub version of those religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their de cisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed."113
Americans have the right to organize religious communities consis tent with the available civil law choices in a particular state and their own religious self understanding. In order to move beyond the present point, those involved in this transaction must be actively cooperating with each other over a common set of principles. It requires more than simple con sultation. In the end, it requires assent-that the current mode of opera tion has created a set of potential and real difficulties that must be ad dressed, even if, in the end, the answer that is given is "this is the best we can do for now." It requires resort to a perspective beyond the parochial or even diocesan good. It requires asking what the common good of the Church in the United States requires at this time. A hodgepodge of an swers, inconsistent with each other and at odds with the civil and canon law approaches taken by neighbors will do no one any good.
We can do better. We must get it right.
Appendix: Principal Legal Issues for Pastors and Administrators1'4
5. Financial administration issues-Accounting regularity & fi nancial transparency to the members / avoiding financial irreg ularities. Honoring donor restrictions.
6. "Innovative" fund raising schemes-UBIT, the rich person's exception to the rules on common sense ("don't worry, rich donors love this kind of activity by churches"), etc.
7. Structures-how are we organized and operated? Do we re spect those limits and act within our authority? (staying within the administrative authority proper to that entity (school board runs the school, not the church, etc.)) Does an administrator or board sometimes act with "apparent authority" to do actions technically outside their legal competence? How much control do we exercise versus some other entity within the church?
8. "Trust clause"-denominational affiliation issues: local vs re gional vs national jurisdiction over certain matters, how close and how enforceable an affiliation?
9. Land use issues-zoning and restrictions, easements, over sight, RLUIPA, etc.
10. Compliance with local, state, and federal tax rules-reporting, qualification for exemption, property and sales tax issues, PILOTS/SILOTS, etc. Compliance with the federal tax ex emption (political activity, lobbying activity, financial transac tions)
11. Misconduct issues-setting and enforcing policy; background checks on clergy, employees, and volunteers; training and re educating personnel on child protection issues, reporting abuse; dealing with the criminal and civil justice system; setting and enforcing church discipline; crisis communications policies 12. Dealing with foreign bom members (immigration and enculturation issues, undocumented persons (complicates the vol unteer issues)) and ministers and church workers 13. Copyright issues (copying and using ministry and music materials)
14. Labor and employment issues/ workplace issues-hiring, fir ing, compensating, not discriminating (especially note the dif-ferences between state/local rules on religious employers with the Title VII exemption), religious identity, "employee/ spousal" benefits issues, workers comp (also an insurance issue) 
